How could a policeman of a known danger shoot a truck driver and control his vices in Berlin Christmas market? What could police and authorities have done and must do to prevent deaths of twelve people? For almost a year now, Committee of Inquiry in Berlin House of Representatives has been working on answering se questions, today's Friday is last meeting before summer recess.
What have members learned so far?So far, Committee has mainly examined time before attack. At that time, later assassin Anis Amri had already been known to authorities in Berlin and North Rhine-Westphalia as Islamist.
In interviews, members of parliament found little news. Marcel Luran, chairman of FDP group, says this at least: "In a year's work committee has been able to gain almost no knowledge." The only success so far is "that we have worked out absolute inability of police to respond to attack."
In fact, special investigator Bruno Jost had already described in his final report Personalnot and chaos in state Criminal Police Office (LKA) Berlin. Several officials reported in Committee that y had not written congestion indicators in vain. The head of State Protection Department, Jutta Porzucek, even asked for more staff at Anschlagstag.
The sis also confirmed that "too many authorities have accompanied too uncoordinated risks," says Benedikt Lux, chairman of Green Group. In best case, you could have prevented attack, says Lux. But re was not a single failure that made attack possible, but "a concatenation of errors that should not have happened."
One of se mistakes was miscalculation that Amri did not plan a stop. In telephone surveillance, it was found that Amri was pursuing a "salafistischen Islam", said a clerk who was involved in case in Berlin. However, re were no concrete signs in talks that would have pointed to terrorist attack plans.
"Not everything that is identified as an error is also really cause of attack," says Committee chairman Burkard Dregger (CDU). "The question of wher attack could have been prevented could not yet be answered seriously."
Where are re contradictions?Was Amri one of many or was he Topgefährder in Berlin? The Islamic department regularly placed it on list of people to officers carrying out with priority 1. But re were still "tens of ors" at risk of observing, including Syria's returnees, said n department leader. Anor executive said that Amri had been ranked in or, similarly relevant cases in capital city. When he started to act with drugs, likelihood of an attack was not so great. "I thought: anor stink boot in this city that only binds resources," said official.
A young clerk, on or hand, said, "I thought he was dangerous, but I couldn't appreciate it because of my experience." Apparently re was no uniform line in assessment of Islamist Gefährdern. The young clerk said that "non-Islamic behaviour" Amris, drug trade, was considered untypical for assassins. On question in committee, on which this assessment is based, he said: "That was what I learned in Commissariat."
"What has become apparent as a mistake for time being is that or offences such as drug trafficking have not been used to pull Amri out of circulation," says Dregger. I am not able to say wher that would have been successful, but it was not tried. That is, of course, unfortunate in post-examination. "
An important date is also 18th February 2016: Witnesses repeatedly report different versions of day on which Anis Amri drove with a coach from Dortmund to Berlin. It is a fact that LKA in North Rhine-Westphalia warned Berlin that Amri was on its way re. The Berliner took Amri at central bus station and confiscated his cell phone.
A senior terrorist investigator from North Rhine-Westphalia accused his colleagues from Berlin that Amri had been warned by this. NRW wanted Amri to be secretly observed: "We have been completely surprised by control," he said in committee. The NRW official also criticized fact that case with a "better-qualified State Protection department" in Berlin would have been "better".
Date Of Update: 22 June 2018, 12:02
