The Galician justice decrees that the birth of a dead son counts when calculating the mother's retirement pension

The Superior Court of Justice of Galicia (TSXG) has decreed that the birth of a dead child counts as a child for calculating the mother's retirement pension and stands out that maternity complement in contributory pensions is conceived as a measure Specific "in favor of women to correct patent situations of inequality in fact regarding men."

In a sentence on October 15 of this year and that the High Court Gallego has reported this Saturday, the Judges of the Social Room understand that the "situation of discrimination" suffered by women for being workers and mothers "It occurred since the moment of pregnancy, regardless of whether it came to fruition."

Therefore, they explain in the resolution, they consider that this complement should be applied in the case of missing the child before being born, as it tries to compensate for "labor discrimination suffered by women workers, especially those at the same time have been Mothers, and more especially those who have had more than one child, all in order to reduce a gap, which is not only a salary, also thoughtional. "

In this way, the TSXG rejects in the failure the arguments of the National Institute of Social Security and the General Social Security Treasury, who defend that the birth of a dead child "does not count as a child for the purposes of recognition and, In your case, the amount of the motherhood complement in contributory pensions. "

In addition, in the same judgment, magistrates indicate that Article 236.1 of the General Social Security Law must be interpreted in the sense that the quoted benefit granted by child care or less is generated "by all children born between The birth of the first child after the interruption of the insurance career and within six further years, provided that the insurance career had been interrupted in the nine months prior to the birth of that first child. "

In this way, they explain that, in the specific case they analyze in the resolution, this contribution benefit should be applied to the appellant for both the first child (as has admitted social security) and for the second daughter (which denies the Administration) Because that second daughter, like the first child, "has been born between the interruption of the contribution as a result of the extinction of the labor relationship and the completion of the sixth year after the birth of the Son".

The Social Room of the TSXG recalls that the goal of benefit for child care is "to compensate for interruptions in insurance races of those working people (usually women)" that stop them for "child care or minor".

In this sense, he considers that it would be "cut, at least in part if, having more than one birth in the temporary period ranged from nine months before the birth of the first child up to six years after that birth, only the benefit was born (or born) of that first birth, it would be as much as only to compensate the working person for the care of that child (or children), as if others born within the temporary period referred to, which obviously have the The same need for care that the standard contemplates as a justificative purpose of the benefit granted, were forgotten by the standard. "

The TSXG concludes that the interpretation of the benefit contemplated in Article 236.1 of the General Social Security Law in a restrictive sense would be "as much as justifying an adverse impact on women, while improving a conciliation interpretation that would harm the Working people who reconcile, men or women ".