Hardly anyone has followed German-Polish relations as closely as Rolf Nikel in recent years. He was German ambassador to Poland for more than six years. Now he has written a book about the relationship between the two countries, including the mistakes of the past few years. Because Rolf Nikel is clear: Germany's Russia, Ukraine and energy policy has failed. He accuses the government in Warsaw of wanting to take advantage of this situation instead of using the "Polish moment".
ntv.de: "The Germans hesitate, evade and act in a way that is difficult to understand," said Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki before it became known that the Chancellor now wants to deliver Leopard tanks to Ukraine . Is Morawiecki right?
Rolf Nikel: First of all, you have to say that the decision to deliver the Leopards was made in the end. I thought she should have fallen sooner. But the fact that a unified Western position has emerged is, in my view, very welcome. The delivery of these main battle tanks is very important for Ukraine, especially in view of the Russian spring offensive that many have been anticipating. The fact that the Polish prime minister publicly put pressure on the German chancellor is rather unusual in the relationship between allies and partners. But everyone has their own peculiarities. There are elections in Poland this year. We have to be prepared for the fact that Germany will play an important role in this election campaign.
How is the decision to supply tanks in Poland evaluated? Is the ruling party "Law and Justice", PiS for short, trying to claim this as its own success?
That is what PiS politicians are trying to do, although it is doubtful that the public pressure was really helpful. In the end, it was the American decision to also supply tanks that led to a change in the German position.
You said there was an election campaign in Poland. But is it enough to dismiss criticism from Poland as an election maneuver?
No, that would be wrong. Poland has been affected by the war in Ukraine in a very, very concrete way. Poland is a direct neighbor of Ukraine, many supply lines run directly through Poland. Poland has admirably welcomed millions of refugees from Ukraine. Everything that happens in Ukraine affects Poland much more - not only because of geography, but also for historical reasons. Parts of western Ukraine once belonged to Poland, to the Polish-Lithuanian Empire from 1918 to 1939. But in addition to geography and history, politics also play a role, of course. Here we see an attempt to capitalize on the failure of Germany's Russia, Ukraine and energy policies through public criticism. But it must be emphasized that this is not the primary motive.
For years, German Russia policy was a disagreement between Germany and Poland. Was the criticism of it cross-party in Poland?
Yes. Various Polish governments and the Polish public have heavily criticized Germany's Russia policy in recent years. You have repeatedly pointed out to us the dependence on Russia in terms of energy policy and the naïve security policy from Poland's point of view. We didn't want to hear that. With the self-destructive Russian attack on Ukraine, German policy failed. For Germany, this means a loss of trust and a weakening of credibility in the region, especially in Poland. With a wise policy of strengthening NATO's eastern flank and supporting Ukraine, we can regain the trust that has been lost.
You write in your book: "In a gross misjudgment of the real situation, the German security policy concept culminated in the false thesis that security in Europe cannot be guaranteed against Moscow, but only with it." Before you became an ambassador, you worked in the Chancellery: How could such a misjudgment come about?
In a way, my book is also a mea culpa. However, history is open to the future. What appears to be a mistake in retrospect is not always recognizable as such in the concrete historical situation. But there is no question about it: We have become dependent on energy policy. We were naïve when it came to security policy and believed that our policies could democratize Russia internally and domesticate it externally. We also believed we could separate an increasingly autocratic Russian domestic policy from economically advantageous cooperation. At the same time, we have not invested enough in safety over the years. Perhaps the biggest mistake was that we didn't have a plan B. Somehow we all believed Plan A would succeed.
Why was there no such misjudgment of Russia in Polish politics?
For many years, Poland was more dependent on Russia than Germany in terms of energy policy. However, the Poles changed course in good time. In the end, I would say that the key reason was our countries' different historical experiences with Russia. Russia's role in German unity in 1871 was positive, as it was in reunification in 1990. Poles, on the other hand, have consistently had negative experiences with Russia. Like Germany, Russia was involved in all partitions of Poland, from 1772 to the Hitler-Stalin Pact. While we have made a fundamental about-face in relations with the Soviet Union and Russia since 1989/90, Poland remained sceptical. Even after 2014, after the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass, NATO's measures to strengthen the eastern flank did not go far enough for the Poles. Poland also viewed the Minsk negotiations with skepticism. We, on the other hand, assumed that the problems could be solved with such a political process.
You write that Chancellor Merkel was very friendly towards Poland. But wasn't she completely indifferent to the objections from Warsaw against Germany's Russia policy?
No, you can't say that. I believe that as the Federal Republic of Germany we have both tried to introduce our position within the European Union and we have also tried to promote a cooperative policy with Russia. Economically, Germany and Europe have of course also benefited from cheaper energy. This is not about the politics of individuals. It was a systemic failure affecting every federal government since the end of the Cold War, with strong support from business and large sections of civil society.
How would you describe German-Polish relations today?
You have to differentiate there. Germany and Poland are good and difficult neighbors at the same time. On the one hand, we have a very solid basis. Since the fall of the Wall, people have come together in a way we never dared to dream of. Since 1991, three million young people have taken part in German-Polish youth exchanges. There are very successful city partnerships, cooperation between universities, cross-border cooperation, cooperation between the police and customs, etc. Economic exchange is also developing extremely dynamically. Germany has long been Poland's most important trading partner, while Poland is Germany's fifth largest export partner and fourth largest import partner. With the four Visegrád states together, i.e. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we have a far higher trade volume than with our largest economic partner, the People's Republic of China. These are very strong pillars on which relationships rest.
But?
We have a number of problems. One is the consequences of Germany's Russia policy. The second is the argument about history. And the third is the conflict over the rule of law, which is essentially being fought out between Brussels and Warsaw. It's difficult in all three areas at the moment.
To what extent do these conflicts depend on the current governing party, the PiS?
Poland is indeed highly polarized domestically. When it comes to the rule of law, the opposition in Poland has a very different position from the government. For the other two issues, this is not so clear.
Your book states that the PiS government is trying to weaken German influence in Europe through all sorts of informal alliances and to strengthen its own regional leadership role.
This refers above all to the so-called Three Seas Initiative, in which the eastern EU states between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas are working together. Germany is geographically located on one of the three seas - on the same as Poland, on the Baltic Sea. Despite this, the Polish government has still not been able to bring itself to declare us a full member. Officially, the Three Seas Initiative is about strengthening the infrastructure in the region, and that's totally fine. But there are prominent voices in Poland who see this concept as an attempt to weaken Germany's role in this region. That was very specific when the American President was still called Donald Trump.
How do you rate the Polish demands for reparations against Germany?
I don't want to explain the German legal position in detail, it's well known. What I would like to say, however, is that I do not think it is wise to raise such demands at a time when, in view of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, it would be necessary to demonstrate the greatest possible Western unity. And: Germany has always made voluntary gestures in the past, and further gestures are undoubtedly possible. Under public pressure, however, this is unlikely to happen.
In general, it is undoubtedly true that there is not enough representation in Germany of how much the Polish population - Jewish and non-Jewish Poles - suffered during the Second World War. Six million Polish citizens were murdered by Germans, some brutally. During World War II, 95 percent of Warsaw was destroyed by German units. In order to raise awareness of this, the "Place of Remembrance and Encounter with Poles" should also be created, which the German Bundestag decided in October 2020.
The Federal Foreign Office then commissioned a commission of experts under your leadership to develop a concept (pdf) for this location.
From our point of view, the place should also be a monument. It was very important to us to design a concept that also includes diverse encounters, especially for the younger generation. This has to be done quickly now. This is what the German civil society initiative that originally launched the project expects. And the Poles expect that too.
Couldn't the Russian invasion of Ukraine also have been a new start for German-Polish relations?
I think that Germany, with its policy of turning the tide, has moved closer to Poland's Russia policy than ever before. That could be the initial spark for a new common Ostpolitik supported by both sides. The Polish government has so far preferred to try to capitalize on the situation that has arisen. There is a danger that this "Polish moment", in which Poland is benefiting from a new attitude on the part of Germany, will pass sooner than some people imagine.
How is your personal relationship with Poland?
Very good. My wife and I have felt very comfortable in the six years that we have been in Poland. We have traveled to Poland on business and privately and often, we got to know the diversity of the landscape, the great culture, which is far too little known in Germany. We made many friends with whom we are still in contact. I have great sympathy for Poland and suffer from the fact that Polish-German relations are so difficult in some areas at the moment. That is also one of the reasons why I wrote the book "Enemies - Strangers - Friends: Poles and the Germans". Enemies have become friends. But in many ways we are still strangers.
Hubertus Volmer spoke to Rolf Nikel
