A year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag, Michael Roth, warns of a slacking off in Western military aid. "I think it's naive wishful thinking that we can achieve a just and sustainable peace if we give in to Putin again," says the SPD politician in an interview with ntv.de. "Our task is to make the Ukrainian government strong," says Roth about possible negotiations with Russia. Beijing could also force an end to the war with its announced initiative from Putin, but: "I doubt that this will exists."
ntv.de: The West is actually pursuing the goal of Russia at least withdrawing back beyond the borders of February 23, 2022. However, many people in the supporter countries also doubt that this can be achieved by conventional military means. What do you say?
Michael Roth: When the war started a year ago, almost all military experts assumed that Ukraine would be overrun in a very short time. Then several miracles happened. The first and, for me, the most amazing miracle is the infinite bravery of the Ukrainians, who absolutely do not want to submit to Russian tyranny. The second is the willingness of the West, including Germany, to learn quickly from the mistakes of the past and to provide Ukraine with the best possible political, financial, humanitarian and, above all, military support.
A third surprise is that Russia's military leadership has proven far more inept than previously suspected. Western governments and intelligence agencies had little idea of Russian realities.
Without the intelligence from the United States, we would probably have been caught by surprise. Obama was probably right when he - very provocatively and perhaps politically clumsily - called Russia a "regional power" a few years ago. The conventional armed forces, but also the economic, social and political situation in Russia do not correspond to a superpower. Only its nuclear arsenal makes Russia a superpower: no other country in the world has more nuclear weapons.
Are we clearer today in assessing what Russia can and intends to do, especially in the federal government? Because back then there was obviously a discrepancy between reality and perception.
I find it remarkable how quickly Germany in particular went through a learning process that was painful but necessary. Not only the SPD, but the whole of German society was strongly influenced by the idea that it is right to pursue a dialogue-oriented policy of understanding with Russia - no matter how great the extent of destabilization and military violence that Russia is in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. The elephant in the room is the question: Could this war have been prevented?
And would you have?
I have a cynical answer and a harsh answer. The cynical answer: of course one would have. People who understand Putin always tell me that in 2001 he gave a big, conciliatory speech in the Bundestag. If we had then worked together with Putin and accepted without ifs and buts that he was in charge in Eastern Europe, then this war could probably have been prevented. But then we would have effectively handed over countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to Russia for better or for worse. The people of Eastern Europe would have had to pay a terribly high price for such a peace order. We would have denied them the right to self-determination, freedom and democracy.
And the hard answer?
If the West, by 2014 at the latest, after the illegal annexation of Crimea, had adopted a policy that combined a willingness to engage in dialogue with Russia with toughness and military deterrence, this war would probably not have happened either.
Would a tough policy have been enforceable in 2014 - in the SPD, in the federal government and in public?
Probably not. German society was too permeated by Russian narratives for that. For example, the story that Russia is the successor state to the Soviet Union and that we have to exercise particular restraint towards Russia because of our historical responsibility. This applies at least as much to Ukraine, which also suffered from the Nazis' war of annihilation. Or that NATO shares responsibility for Russia's behavior towards Ukraine because it is said to have expanded too aggressively into Central and Eastern Europe. But we could not seriously have told these states that they had to accept that their fortunes would continue to be determined by Moscow.
The Germans are divided on the urgency of peace negotiations, with each side pointing to noble principles: one side reminds us that any acceptance of Russian territorial conquests would undermine the state order that protects all of us security, and that the Ukrainians living there are the Russian tyranny would be abandoned. The other side wants a ceasefire to end the killing and protect Europe and the world from a direct NATO-Russia confrontation. Are both camps equally right?
Nobody has a blueprint in their drawer for this war. Both approaches are associated with risks, including my strategy of defending yourself and showing solidarity with Ukraine. We will probably only know in a few years what the right way would have been. I think it's naïve wishful thinking that if we give in to Putin again, we'll have a just and sustainable peace. If he is not stopped now, he will continue his imperialist-colonialist policies. He has no interest in "fraternal people" living in democracy and freedom in the immediate vicinity, coupled with prosperity for many. Then it would also become clear to the Russians that there is an alternative to Russia's perverse state capitalism, which has made a few very rich and left many in poverty and without prospects.
According to this interpretation, there is actually no chance of substantive peace negotiations without a complete military defeat for Russia.
Wars are usually ended at the negotiating table, but decided on the battlefield. I realize that many people find it unacceptable when I talk about enforcing peace by force of arms. But right now, a quick end to the war would also mean the end of free, democratic Ukraine. Nobody wants to destroy Russia in any way. We are not striving for a regime change in Moscow either; the Russians themselves decide that. We simply expect Russia to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighboring countries without any ifs or buts. A peace solution still seems possible to me. But it is essential for Ukraine to be able to enter into negotiations from a position of strength when the time comes.
When will Putin be ready for this?
That is the one trillion euro question. Putin's goal is to split the West, destroy Ukraine militarily, economically and socially, and also mentally destroy the population. We can not permit that. In Russia, I don't currently see any significant opposition to this war. It's a conformist country without a free media, so Putin doesn't have to be so considerate. On the other hand, as the gifted propagandist that he is, Putin could also convert defeat into victory at home.
Should the West urge Ukraine to give up Crimea?
No democracy in the world recognized the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, including Germany. For us, Crimea remains Ukrainian territory. The expectation that the Ukrainian president will now give up Crimea is therefore extremely strange. Selenskyj actually has to demand inhuman things from his people every day. In order to do that, he has to show them a light at the end of the tunnel. Just as the Federal Chancellor quite rightly claims to take the concerns and misgivings of our population seriously, we should not deny the Ukrainian President the right to include the expectations of his own society in his political actions.
Even the supporting countries are signaling to Ukraine that a military recapture of Crimea is viewed with skepticism. In my opinion, this also applies to the Chancellery. Why is that? If Putin had to fear losing Crimea, that would be leverage for negotiations.
I don't share your perception. The Federal Government - including the Federal Chancellor - has made it clear that the Ukrainians have to decide for themselves. Academics and expert circles can discuss which territorial losses would be reasonable for Ukraine. However, I strongly advise those with political responsibility not to take part in such debates. Our task is to make the Ukrainian government strong and not to make it more difficult for it to find a possible solution at the negotiating table.
But can Ukraine ever feel safe as long as Crimea is a Russian staging area and the country remains encircled from north, east and south?
The Ukrainians must also decide on this. Negotiations will, of course, also revolve around guarantees that a Russian attack will not be repeated. And our support in the medium and long term will be aimed at making Ukraine so resilient that Russia will never again dare to endanger its security, independence and territorial integrity. The best guarantee for this is a modern, well-trained and conventionally equipped Ukrainian army of the highest standard.
Can Europe and the US even begin to normalize relations with Russia as long as the country does not pay billions of euros in reparations and those responsible for the war crimes are brought to justice? And if not, why should Putin stop fighting if the country will remain a pariah state afterwards?
After all, Russia has made itself a pariah and entered an economic and political dead end. This is a severe humiliation for Putin and his claim to be a great power. At the moment, I lack the imagination to imagine Russia returning to the circle of respected states under Putin. That's why it's a very academic debate about when and how and whether sanctions should be rolled back.
I don't find the debate all that academic: unless Russia completely caves in and atones for these terrible crimes, Europe will live next door to this pariah who threatens our security for decades to come.
First of all, Ukraine must win this war. That means it must remain a sovereign, democratic country that freely decides on its own future while maintaining its territorial integrity. Of course, I too hope to see a Russia without Putin that finally embarks on the arduous path to democracy and the rule of law. We should do our best to support that. I'm totally with you on the reparations. That's why I demand that we find creative and legally secure solutions to use Russia's huge frozen foreign assets and also the assets of the Russian oligarchs for the reconstruction of Ukraine. And of course we must also hold those responsible for this brutal war of annihilation accountable.
In recent months, the federal government has repeatedly been seen as a procrastinator, both domestically and among international partners. Recently, the chancellor has headed an international coalition to supply main battle tanks, but has little support from continental Europe. Why?
I am grateful to the Federal Chancellor that he has now taken on this special and also difficult leadership responsibility. I am disappointed that some states, which have repeatedly publicly declared their intention to join a European tank alliance, are now taking longer. Most states that have modern Leopard main battle tanks do not reject a delivery in principle, but point to technical or logistical problems. That could have been clarified months ago.
Doesn't that also apply to Germany? Olaf Scholz always assures that all delivery decisions have been thoroughly prepared and agreed between the partners. Now the Leopard decision was made on a rather short-term basis and the chancellor had to realize afterwards that others were not going along with it. What does that say about Scholz's governance?
The decisive condition for the Chancellor was that the USA participate in the tank coalition. He succeeded. He then sent the clear signal that Germany, together with others, was sending the more modern variant of the Leopard 2. In addition, other NATO countries around Poland are providing a battalion of the older Leopard 2A4 variant. There is certainly room for improvement, but with the best will in the world one cannot blame the federal government for that.
Isn't the much-vaunted European unity towards Russia really that far away?
Some countries communicate well, others act well. When it comes to Germany's commitment, words and deeds ultimately go together: no other country in the EU supplies Ukraine with as many weapons as Germany. But we also have to be honest: without the outstanding military support of the USA, Ukraine would probably have lost the war long ago. This paints a bleak picture of the defense capabilities of the EU and its member states.
Until US President Biden declassified the Abrams, the Chancellor vehemently denied that there would be such a "joint". In times of war, does a chancellor have to deceive the public in order to assert German interests?
It's not about deception, it's about doing the best we can for Ukraine as a team, without getting dragged into this war ourselves. Assisting Ukraine requires the utmost sensitivity and mutual consideration on the part of its partner countries. The close alliance with the USA ensures that Ukraine will ultimately have significantly more tanks at its disposal for its liberation struggle.
China has announced a diplomatic peace initiative. What do you think of it?
Every effort towards peace deserves a chance. If China is willing to play a constructive role in ending this war, that is to be welcomed. It was already a diplomatic success for Chancellor Scholz that Beijing showed Putin a stop sign on the subject of nuclear weapons. But you also have to look at it realistically: the Chinese are not behaving neutrally in this war, but are supporting Russia politically and economically. For example, they supply civilian products that can also be used for military purposes, so-called dual-use goods. That's why I'm very skeptical as to whether China can credibly play the role of mediator. On the other hand, I'm sure that China is one of the few countries that could persuade Putin to give in if they really wanted to. But I doubt that this will exists.
Sebastian Huld and Hubertus Volmer spoke with Michael Roth
