Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been talk of German leadership in Europe - once again. There are important reasons why the idea is not a good one, including the experience of the Merkel years.
People are talking again about the German leadership in Europe. Sometimes it is demanded that Germany must take the lead in Europe and not let the continent continue to drift without leadership. Sometimes there are also warnings of a dangerous German hegemony that will repeat the Nazi occupation of Europe in a new form.
One should not be under the illusion that this discussion is new. Ever since the Bismarck Empire was founded around 150 years ago, Germans and other Europeans alike have repeatedly discussed, attempted to enforce and opposed Germany's leadership in Europe. Four conclusions can be drawn from this long history of leadership debate.
The first conclusion was already drawn by the historian Ludwig Dehio immediately after the Second World War: Germany is demographically, economically, militarily and culturally too small to lead Europe. It is easy to overlook the fact that Germany represents just under a fifth of the population of the current European Union and only a quarter of the European Union's national product. The population of North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany is larger than the population of Germany in the EU.
Real leaders in history were based on very different demographic and economic weights. Prussia's leading role in Bismarck's time was based on the fact that around two thirds of the population of the German Empire were Prussians and around two thirds of the German Empire's economy was generated in Prussia - not to mention the military strength of the Prussian army. The leadership of the United States in NATO after 1945 was also demographically and economically effective, as well as militarily and culturally effective. The US population was roughly half that of NATO in the 1950s and generated well over half of NATO's economic output at the time.
Measured against these two hegemonies, Germany is demographically and economically too small to claim leadership in Europe. There is no need to discuss Germany's military and cultural weight in today's Europe any further. A leadership role can certainly not be derived from this.
Second, there is no evidence that the German elites are developing the ability to assume such a leadership role, if they want to at all. Concepts that German governments use internationally have been developed for decades. This includes the ordoliberal concept of the frugal, social state, the concept of the decentralized federal state with great independence of the supreme court, the central bank and the Court of Auditors, and finally the concept of international peacekeeping through trade.
But these concepts are tailored to the German situation. In other European countries, they don't find that much understanding and support to be able to build on a German leadership role. The Ukraine war also devalues at least the concept of peacekeeping through trade. In any case, the chances of success of these concepts are far lower than the concept of the USA after the Second World War, which was more successful with clever economic support such as the Marshall Plan and the combination of prosperity and democracy.
Thirdly, there is also no indication that Germany as sole leader would be desired, demanded and supported in other European countries. The proposals or ideas for sole leadership by Germany in Europe come primarily from the USA, which want to simplify their European policy and ideally focus on one contact person. Such proposals, on the other hand, only very rarely come from the member states of the European Union. Of course, many want a clear, energetic, well thought-out, far-sighted German European policy. But that is different from the sole European leadership by Germany.
Finally, the long years of Angela Merkel's government up to 2017 can be viewed as a kind of testing period for German leadership in Europe, since for most of those years the other major European countries were politically unusually weak. Great Britain internally said goodbye to the European Union. The French presidents before Emmanuel Macron were internationally insignificant. Italy was shaken by severe crises. Poland fled into a kind of self-isolation.
During this time, the federal government actually took on a leadership role that had not been planned beforehand. But it is hard to claim that the years of this unwanted German leadership were particularly good years for the European Union. Rather, it was a time of severe crises that the German government was not responsible for. But the major crises, the financial crisis, the Ukraine crisis, Brexit and the refugee crisis have not been permanently resolved. During this period, the European Union also became weaker demographically, economically and militarily on a global scale. One cannot blame the Merkel governments for this either. But Germany cannot claim that this epoch, in which Europe was most likely to be led by Germany, was a German heyday of the European Union and that Germany proved itself in this leadership role.
History does not encourage seeing Germany as the leading power in Europe again. There is much more to suggest that Germany is leading Europe together with a group of other countries, making sure that the interests of the smaller countries are also taken into account. Leading Europe through several countries was the guiding principle of all German governments from Konrad Adenauer to Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt and Angela Merkel to Olaf Scholz. This common leadership of Europe in the European Union is an important achievement in European history. European integration is directed against the rule of a single country in Europe, and for good reason. There is no reason to give up this achievement and try again to lead Germany alone in Europe, which failed extremely bloodily in two world wars.
Prof. Dr. Hartmut Kaelble held a chair in social history at the Humboldt University in Berlin until 2008. He is one of the most renowned German social historians.
