Gwendolyn Sasse has written a book about a war that is not over yet. In it, she explains the background, above all "the longer lines, the history and, in part, the consequences that are becoming apparent" of the Russian attack on Ukraine. From their point of view, the invasion since February 24 is the third phase of a war that began in 2014.
ntv.de: One chapter of your book is entitled "Why this war? Why now?" In short, what is your answer?
Gwendolyn Sasse: Putin is the most important catalyst of this war, and that already applies to the annexation of Crimea. But there are other factors that made this war possible. In my view, the contrast between authoritarian, neo-imperial Russia and democratizing Ukraine is particularly important. For Putin, this war is primarily about preventing a different political model in the immediate vicinity of Russia. He saw a time window for this at the beginning of 2022.
They describe the Russian war against Ukraine in three phases: the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Donbass war in the same year, and then the February raid.
The annexation of Crimea is the first step in this war, with which Russia surprised the West, Ukraine and also the Russian people. For Putin, the annexation of Crimea was also about testing the reaction of the West and Ukraine. In doing so, he created the basis for the further phases of this war. Without the annexation of Crimea there would not have been a large-scale war of aggression.
One occasionally hears the thesis that Putin is a kind of midwife of the Ukrainian nation, because only his war of aggression created a genuine Ukrainian identity. Is that true?
Putin did much to strengthen Ukrainians' sense of belonging to the Ukrainian nation and state. But Ukrainian identity didn't start with him. The feeling of an inclusive Ukrainian state made up of people from different ethnic backgrounds who speak different languages - this begins at the latest in 1991 with Ukraine's independence in its current borders. In the December 1991 referendum, shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a majority across the country voted for independent Ukraine, including Crimea, albeit with a smaller majority. Since then, Ukraine has democratized through various protest movements - already under the first President Leonid Kuchma, then with the Orange Revolution in 2004 and 2013/14 at the Euromaidan. It was always about the fact that a large part of society advocated a different political model: a less corrupt, more democratic system. This feeds the Ukrainian understanding of being an inclusive nation.
On the other hand, there is Putin with his authoritarian worldview.
Putin's world view turns against everything supposedly Western - against democracy with its liberal principles and values. His writings and state propaganda have become more and more radical. What the alternative to the West is is never really stated - there is always a lot of talk about traditional values that need to be preserved, but above all it is a rejection of the West as a political system that is presented as a danger. In this worldview, rejection of the West includes a claim to imperial power - the rhetoric on this point has also intensified in recent years. It culminated in the assertion that Ukraine is in fact not an independent state but part of the Russian nation.
Your book says that the paradox of Putin's decision to invade Ukraine is "that in the medium to long term he is endangering the political system he has established in Russia."
For Putin, maintaining his power has long been the focus of his political activities. However, he is jeopardizing this position of power with this war. The risk he is taking is already evident from the fact that he has to react to the hardliners around him, give their more radical positions space and escalate the war - for example through the air raids that have been taking place in Ukraine intensified since last week, or through the Mobilization. Putin rules with a loyalty-based system that may one day break down. We're seeing early signs of this, but it's still too early to really predict an end to the system. There have not yet been widespread protests, even if insecurity is growing from below. Combined with the economic situation - which is getting worse as a result of the sanctions - something could be brewing to challenge the system. That is the paradox: Putin wants to use this war to strengthen and expand his system. But it can also be hollowed out from the inside.
Former Chancellor Merkel is currently traveling through the country with a message: "From the perspective of the time," the gas deals with Russia were correct. Was that them?
In my view, they weren't. I also think it would be desirable if one could critically reflect on these decisions in retrospect - also from the point of view of those who were involved in them. Even before Merkel, under Schröder, the decision was made to rely on cheap gas from Russia. Germany has thus made itself too dependent on an authoritarian system. In retrospect it is clear that this was a mistake. But it could and should have been clear back then that such a one-sided dependency is not right. The federal government has repeatedly claimed that economic relations can be separated from political relations and from security policy issues. That was still the government line in January. That was clearly wrong.
What signal did the then German government send to Putin when it approved the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in 2015, a year after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the Donbass war?
For Putin and the Russian elite who supported him, this ensured that Germany and other parts of Europe would be dependent on Russian gas for a long time to come. He now had leverage. All the sanctions imposed by the European Union in response to the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass war then also ran counter to dependency on Russian gas and oil. The signal was: Putin could be sure that political relations would always be arranged in such a way that these deliveries would not be disrupted.
You don't mention Merkel in the book, not even when it comes to the Minsk agreements. Why not?
It was not a conscious decision not to name individuals. The accent of the 128 pages is on the social and political dynamics in Ukraine and Russia, the international context is discussed on the basis of structures and trends. In any case, it's not about me wanting to mince my words to spare someone. On the contrary, I take a very critical view of the role of the last German governments in terms of one-sided energy dependency and the belief in being able to manage the security policy risk. But this book is not about the mistakes of individuals - otherwise the list would have been very long.
Because you mentioned Minsk: I don't see Merkel's role as critical there. From my point of view, the Minsk Agreement, which she was involved in, was an important attempt at that point in time to reach a ceasefire at a critical moment.
Minsk was unfavorable for Ukraine.
The agreement came at an unfavorable time for Ukraine. Ukraine was then in no position to defend itself, and the West was unwilling to support Ukraine with arms. Without Minsk, Ukraine would have been in an even worse situation. It became increasingly clear that Russia was never interested in implementing the agreement - this is part of the learning process, which also led to Ukraine adopting a different military stance. And the West has also learned from it.
You write in the foreword that Putin is concerned with the destruction of the independent Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian nation. Is this a genocidal war?
It is still too early for a final assessment. From my perspective and also from the perspective of experts with historical and criminal law expertise, one can already say that this war has genocidal elements - including in the rhetoric of Putin, Medvedev and others. The ongoing investigations will show whether the Russian war of aggression will later be classified overall as genocide, or whether it will remain in the categories of "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity". Genocide is a complex criminal offense under international law, we are not at that point yet.
What was it actually like to write a book about a war that was still going on? Have you tried to fade out the current war events in order not to lose sight of the long lines?
I tried to think in parallel and to follow the events of the war. But it is not possible to write against the events of the war and always stay up to date. That's not what this book was about. I deliberately placed the emphasis on the longer lines, the prehistory and, in part, on the consequences that are already emerging. I was particularly concerned with some common misperceptions about Ukraine and about Russia, and also how this war came about.
Does Putin need a face-saving way out of this war? And can the West offer him this path at all?
I find the wording problematic. Why would the West offer Putin a face-saving way out? There were several avenues where he could have made different choices. Before the invasion began in February, there was an opportunity to negotiate security issues with NATO and the US at the highest level. In the first days and weeks after the start of the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy put a lot on the table for negotiations. He has offered Ukraine's neutrality and a freeze on the conflict, effectively going back to pre-February 24 levels, leaving parts of Donbass and Crimea sidelined for now. However, it was repeatedly shown that there was no political will for negotiations in Moscow. Every escalation came from the Russian side. At the moment, therefore, there is no room for negotiation for Ukraine. Putin, on the other hand, could end the war at any time and let his propaganda announce a success.
Can he really do that after the annexation of the four Ukrainian regions?
With the annexations and also with the mobilization it will be more difficult, yes. However, the annexation was kept surprisingly vague. It is not clear exactly which territory was annexed or when it is planned to switch to the ruble there. I don't want to belittle these annexations. But if he wanted to, he could say that Russia retreats to the Donbass.
Hubertus Volmer spoke to Gwendolyn Sasse
