The war is now arriving in Russia, says political scientist Jens Siegert, who has lived in Moscow for almost 30 years. "How quickly people actually notice that is another question." In Russia there is a deep-seated conviction "that everything will be decided without the people - both among the not so many opponents of the regime and among those who are for Putin". The opposition has had this experience again and again: "Despite all the protests, nothing has changed, everything has always gotten worse."
ntv.de: How was the mood in Russia with regard to the war up to Putin's speech last Wednesday?
Jens Siegert: There was passive, silent support for this war, at least no active rejection in a large part of the population. At the same time, most people wanted nothing to do with the war. This was also possible because the war in Russia was only noticeable in regions directly bordering Ukraine, where rockets occasionally landed. In large parts of Russia, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, the war played no part in everyday life until last week's mobilization.
Did mobilization change that? Are young men from the urban middle and upper classes now afraid that they will be sent to the front?
Yes, the war is now arriving in Russia. How quickly people actually notice this is another question. I asked my friends if their sons or they were affected. It's an issue for everyone. Everyone is wondering: Who can be drafted now? Putin and his people speak of partial mobilization. But if you look at the ukase that regulates mobilization, there is nothing about "part". In principle, any of the 30 million conscripts can be drafted - it depends on who the army wants. Incidentally, women can also be drafted. Anyone who works in the medical field is eligible to move in. There have been reports of doctors being drafted.
Does this also apply to ethnic Russians and members of the upper and middle classes? So far, Russia seems to be waging this war primarily with the poor and members of ethnic minorities.
This has always affected ethnic Russians as well. The problem with minority republics is that many of them are among the poorest areas in Russia. This applies to, for example, Dagestan in the North Caucasus or Buryatia in Siberia. There aren't many opportunities for young men to find reasonably well-paid work. So it's attractive to commit to the army for six months. After that you have enough money to pay for an apartment. But that also applies to poor Russians.
In Ukraine, everyone now knows someone who died or was wounded in the war. In Russia this is far from the case, is it?
no The Russian Defense Minister Shoigu has just given a number, almost 6,000 Russian soldiers are said to have died in Ukraine.
He spoke of 5937.
But there could be a lot more. But even if the figure is as high as Ukraine says, which from the outset has quoted about 10 times that figure for Russian casualties, it still wouldn't be enough for a large country that it affects many families. There are 145 million people in Russia. However, there is a strong unequal distribution: According to the official figures, there would be one death for every 100,000 inhabitants in Moscow. I have many friends and acquaintances in Moscow and I don't know anyone who was killed in this war around them. It's different in Dagestan or other poor regions. A colleague told me that she drove through Tver, a poor region northwest of Moscow. There were several fresh graves in every village.
In the West and in Ukraine, there is hope that Putin has overstepped the mark and support for him is collapsing. Do you think that's possible?
A lot is possible, but it's certainly not the case that he's already overstepped the mark. Just because the war is arriving in Russia doesn't mean it's already everywhere. There is talk of up to 300,000 reservists who are to be drafted, although there is speculation that there could be many more. "Novaya Gazeta" has reported that the secret point 7 in Putin's decree contains this number. This was denied by the Kremlin. In any case, it will take a while for so many people to be mobilized.
The Russian writer Dmitry Glukhovsky says that even the people demonstrating against the war are convinced that nothing will change. "They only take the risk out of remorse."
It really is.
What does that say about Russian society?
There is a deep depression in Russia, a belief that everything will be decided without the people - both among not so many opponents of the regime and among those who are pro-Putin. Anyone who rejects Putin has experienced this again and again over the past 20 years: Despite all the protests, nothing has changed, everything has always gotten worse. Putin's followers, on the other hand, have a view of society that corresponds to Putin's, namely that society or individuals as the driving force behind political change do not exist. In July I came back from a trip to Moscow and met a neighbor in the stairwell. She asked me where I was. From Germany, I said, and then I mentioned that it's so complicated to fly via Istanbul now, it took me 15 hours. Yes, yes, she said, it's not all good. "But we didn't do it all, it was the two of them." I didn't follow up, but I'm sure she meant Putin and Biden. It's firmly anchored in people's minds: we can't do anything anyway - what happens is determined by great forces that are far away.
At the beginning of the war, stories circulated of the kind that Ukrainians from the air-raid shelter called their relatives in Russia and had to be told that there was no war. Do the Russians now realize what crimes their country is committing in Ukraine?
Some yes, others no. There are still many who believe Putin's narrative that, first, Ukraine or the West wanted to attack Russia and Russia only forestalled that. And second, that all the atrocities are committed by the Ukrainians and they then blame it on Russia. After all, the Russians are fighting against fascism.
How can you believe something like that?
I think there is a protective function behind it. It would be far too awful to realize that one's own country is responsible for such crimes. That would completely throw off the idea of itself as a peaceful nation. A great many Russians, perhaps most, think that Russia is a peaceful nation that has never attacked anyone and never will. It's always the others.
What is being said in Russia about the referendums in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson? Do you think that Russia has a legitimate claim to these areas?
Many really believe that Russian speakers in Ukraine were oppressed, tortured, killed. The notion that you have not been allowed to speak Russian in Ukraine for the past eight years is widespread in Russia. I know stories of Russians who were invited to Ukraine by relatives and didn't want to go because they were afraid. A few let themselves be persuaded, for them it was a real awakening experience because everything was completely different. But most people believe the propaganda about the suppression of everything Russian in Ukraine.
Is the frequently voiced thesis correct that Putin cannot lose this war and cannot relinquish his power because otherwise he would end up in prison in Russia?
I am sure that at some point he will be accounted for the many deaths in the war - perhaps not primarily the Ukrainian victims, but the Russian ones. The only question is whether he will still be alive. In addition, Putin's regime is highly personalised: everything depends on Putin. No one knows what will happen if one day he dies. Is the constitution respected, according to which the prime minister becomes interim president and a presidential election is held within three months? Are there clashes among the elites? Is there a civil war? No one knows. This uncertainty is part of Putin's ability to stay in power. All of them depend on Putin in some way. On February 21, he demonstrated his power when he forced all members of the State Security Council, all powerful people in principle, one after the other, to stand up and support his actions. It looked a bit like the Mafia, where the newbie is handed a gun to commit murder. Only then does he belong. But then he can't get out.
Another thesis is that Putin could end the war at any time. How do you rate that?
Putin remains in such a strong position that he could end the war tomorrow. I don't think any hardliners would then putsch. It's in his hands. But it is also in his hands to escalate the war.
Four years ago you wrote a book, "111 Reasons to Love Russia". How difficult is this love for you today?
Just as difficult as four years ago. Back then, in the foreword, I asked how one can love a country. But you can't choose that - you don't decide: From now on I love Russia. That just happens. And like a person, you love the country with all its mistakes, maybe even because of the mistakes. The pain is always part of it. And of course there are so many good people in Russia, and such a great culture - although I don't want to single them out, I don't believe in this exceptionalism. I am fully convinced that every country is lovable. And I just love Russia.
Hubertus Volmer spoke to Jens Siegert
