War in Ukraine: "Crossing the nuclear threshold would be suicidal for Russia"

After more than five months of conflict in Ukraine, the war seems more than ever set to last.

War in Ukraine: "Crossing the nuclear threshold would be suicidal for Russia"

After more than five months of conflict in Ukraine, the war seems more than ever set to last. On the ground, the Russian army has been at a standstill since the capture of Severodonetsk and Lyssytchansk in early July. However, Moscow gives no sign of wanting to end its offensive. If, on the other hand, Western military aid has so far enabled kyiv to resist valiantly, its reinforcement could allow the Ukrainian army to achieve victory, believes James Sherr, senior researcher at the Center for Defense and Security , Tallinn, and researcher at Chatham House, London. Maintenance.

L'Express: Less than 24 hours after the agreement signed by Russia and Ukraine to unblock grain in the Black Sea, Moscow bombed the port of Odessa. Should we fear that the cereals agreement will be shattered?

James Sherr: These strikes against the port of Odessa unfortunately confirm the skepticism shown by a certain number of observers vis-à-vis this agreement. In reality, it is not very restrictive for the Russians and there is nothing that specifically prohibits them from attacking the port installations of Ukraine. Moreover, shortly after these strikes, Moscow affirmed that its attack did not constitute a violation of the agreement. However, these attacks are already causing real difficulties for Ukraine. Beyond material damage, uncertainty and the cost of insurance premiums for shipowners have increased. They are now very reluctant to go through Ukrainian ports. I therefore think that this agreement will not be viable in the long term.

Regarding the situation on the front line, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at the end of July that Russian objectives were no longer solely focused on Donbass. Are we heading towards an extension of the Russian offensive?

Russia views the conflict in Ukraine as part of a larger war against the West. In this context, the final defeat of Ukraine is a prerequisite for the weakening of the West in Europe and in the world. So there has never really been a limitation of Russian objectives in Ukraine. When, in March, Russia declared that it was concentrating on the Donbass, in eastern Ukraine, it at the same time contradicted this announcement by imposing, in Zaporizhia and Kherson, in the south of the country, a regime total occupancy.

Russian soldiers in the streets of Mariupol on April 12, 2022

afp.com/Alexander NEMENOV

So in reality, Russian objectives were never limited to Donbass. It was more a way to fool Westerners about Russian intentions than a real change. Russia wants to ruin Ukraine and make it completely dysfunctional, both economically and politically. And while Putin will seek to push as far as possible into Ukraine, he won't need to control all of the territory to prevent it from working.

Do you think Western military aid is enough to prevent Putin from achieving his goals?

Military assistance to Ukraine is very important. We can see on the ground today that the Russian army is having a lot of difficulty advancing. However, the West still refuses to give Ukraine all the tools to defeat Russia. The famous American Himars multiple rocket launchers are certainly very effective, but they were not given in sufficient quantity, nor with sufficiently long-range ammunition, to allow the Ukrainians to conduct truly effective counter-offensives. The great fear in Washington and other Western capitals is that a severe defeat of Russia will push Putin to nuclear escalation.

Much in the West continues to hope that Russia will come to terms with it, and that an eventual agreement between Moscow and Kyiv can provide a long-term basis for a more stable relationship. But this is, in my opinion, an error of analysis. For Russia's interests are linked to a fundamental "reformatting" of the security order in Europe. In December 2021, Moscow presented a draft treaty with NATO, which provided for obliging the Atlantic Alliance to withdraw all the forces it had deployed in Europe since 1997. Concretely, this would have left Poland, the States Baltics and defenseless Romania. This was of course immediately rejected. As it stands, no agreement is possible.

Russia has announced its intention to annex Ukrainian territories, such as Kherson. What will Moscow's reaction be if Ukraine conducts a counter-offensive on territory annexed by Russia?

This is a point to watch closely. If Ukrainian territory is annexed by Russia, then any attack on it will by definition become an attack on Russia itself. Consequently, it will become much more difficult politically to carry out a counter-offensive there. Westerners could be more reluctant to support Ukraine in an action of this type, for fear of reprisals. I think this is the main reason why Russia is pushing for the annexation of Zaporizhia and Kherson.

Do you think Westerners should be tougher on Russia?

We must not allow ourselves to be dissuaded by Russia, it is up to us to dissuade it. The only deterrent that Russia respects is moral force, backed by military force. We have military force, both conventional and nuclear. Now the question is whether we have the moral strength to be deterrent enough.

Two German PZH-2000 howitzers taking part in a NATO exercise, May 10, 2022, near Munster, Germany

Getty Images via AFP

There will be no way to achieve our goals if we refuse to take risks. We must remind the Russians of NATO's military power and the nuclear forces that we too have at our disposal. We do not threaten Russia and do not want an escalation. But if Russia wants to threaten us, it must think about the consequences this could have for it. Crossing the nuclear threshold would be suicidal for Russia.

To be dissuasive, should Westerners rather accelerate arms deliveries to Ukraine?

If Ukraine got all the weapons it asked for, it could carry out large counter-offensives. In this situation, Russia would be faced with two choices: either seek a settlement to the conflict or face further losses. The Western camp must stop doubting: if it provides Ukraine with the capability to defeat Russia on the battlefield, we will end up preventing Moscow from achieving its goals.

Conversely, the risk of a status quo would be to lead to an extremely unstable ceasefire, which, moreover, would make any recovery in Ukraine difficult. Make no mistake, Russia's ambitions have widened, and its hostility to the West has deepened. In this context, there can be no normalization of relations. The situation will really change when the Russian state is defeated and this defeat is perceived as such.

Faced with the manpower difficulties encountered by the Russian army, should we fear that Putin will declare a general mobilization?

Russia has indeed suffered very significant losses and today relies on soldiers recruited from ethnic minorities such as the Chechens, loyal to Kadyrov, the Buryats or the Dagestanis, as well as on private military companies such as Wagner. However, it seems unlikely to me that Putin will declare general mobilization. Beyond the political risk associated with such a measure, it seems that the Russian state no longer has sufficient resources to arm, train and supervise the vast numbers of men who would find themselves sent to the front. We can already see today that Russia is facing shortages and bringing degraded equipment back into service, sometimes dating from the 1960s.

What will happen if Russia achieves its goals in Ukraine?

The stakes in this war are extremely high. If Russia achieves its goals in Ukraine, confidence in the Western position will be permanently weakened. And that will only magnify the problems we face. In Europe, Moldova or Georgia will be even more threatened by Russian expansionism. This will also be the case for Poland and the Baltic countries. One can also easily imagine that Belarus will no longer be able to resist Russia's demands for complete military absorption.

China is also closely watching the Western reaction to this conflict, and in particular any sign of weakness. If the West is unable to deal with an adversary like Moscow, which is weaker than China, Beijing might feel freer to do as it pleases. We are already seeing the first effects, with the tensions around the possible visit of the American president of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan, which the Chinese authorities oppose. Beijing has issued much stronger threats than before, because the Chinese sense our fears when we face serious adversaries. Adversaries, who themselves accept the need to take risks in times of war.