Already today, the day before the NATO summit in Madrid, Turkey is negotiating with Finland and Sweden about the conditions for joining the alliance. It depends on Erdogan, but his position seems stronger than it really is.
Optimism sounds different than what Finnish political expert Henri Vanhanen tweeted on Monday: A solution that would see Erdogan lift his veto on Sweden and Finland joining NATO would require "some thinking outside the box for us." - i.e. ideas beyond what is usual and seems appropriate. How complicated is the dispute with the Turkish President?
What is Erdogan asking for to wave Finland and Sweden through?
From their point of view, one of the main demands that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is making of the northern Europeans is simply non-negotiable: the extradition of several Turkish citizens, who Ankara lists as "terrorists". Swedish or Finnish courts judge these people very differently, have proven their innocence or have ruled that they should not be extradited because they would be in danger if they were not tried in Turkey. They have already made it clear that governments are neither able nor willing to challenge the decisions of their judiciary.
So there is quite clearly nothing that can be done on this issue. Nevertheless, Erdogan is not letting up and is already reaping the rewards of the West making special efforts to win him over. After all, since the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, NATO has been quite successful in demonstrating strength and a unity that has not only surprised Russia's head of state, Vladimir Putin. The fact that Turkey is the only NATO country not supporting sanctions against Russia can be masked by the strong overall picture. However, your rejection of the membership applications from Finland and Sweden is causing significant damage to the performance.
But Erdogan is also demanding other concessions: He would like to have the US Congress approve an order for F-16 fighter jets from the US, and he is calling for the lifting of sanctions that Washington imposed more than a year ago when Turkey was doing so Russian anti-aircraft system S-400 bought and activated.
What is Erdogan planning in northern Syria?
Ankara's behavior in northern Syria is a thorn in the side of its western partners. For several weeks, Turkey has been increasingly attacking the Syrian border areas and has declared that it wants to create a so-called "security zone" that will extend 30 kilometers inland. From Erdogan's point of view, "safe" means: free from Kurdish forces and residents.
Because the Turkish ruler feels threatened by the Kurdish militia, the YPG, which has set up its own administration in northern Syria. He sees her as an arm of the PKK, the Kurdish terrorist organization that is responsible for many attacks in Turkey and is also classified as terrorist by the Europeans and the USA. The YPG, on the other hand, is not considered a terrorist militia in the West. Erdogan even accuses the NATO candidate Sweden of actively supporting the YPG, which the Stockholm government denies. Erdogan's equation of the YPG in northern Syria with the terrorists of the PKK is not completely wrong, because both organizations agree in their ideology, and some of their leaders have close ties.
On the other hand, the accusation that Turkey must feel militarily and therefore in terms of its security threatened by the YPG is not correct. "The YPG focuses exclusively on Syria," says Salim Cevik, Turkey expert at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, ntv.de. In the past, the militia had deliberately avoided attacking Turkey in any form.
However, the YPG Erdogan could still become dangerous if, from a Turkish perspective, it is "too" successful with its self-government in northern Syria. This example could set a precedent and strengthen the Turkish Kurds' desire for autonomy. This is one of the reasons why Erdogan wants to expel the self-governing Kurds from northern Syria.
The West, especially the USA, cannot like this plan because the Kurdish militia has proven to be a reliable partner in the fight against the Islamic State in recent years. The jihadists were successfully pushed back by the Kurdish troops, making the YPG an important partner for Europe and the United States in a country where there is no one else with whom cooperation - no matter how pragmatic - could even be considered. When Erdogan calls on the United States to end its partnership with the YPG, he falls on deaf ears.
How strong is Erdogan's position?
The veto against the northern expansion of NATO, and at the same time the attacks on northern Syria - Erdogan has been deliberately provocative these days, and the special meetings in the run-up to the NATO summit could indicate that he is actually getting closer to his goals with this policy of thick pants . But given the confused situation, it is worth taking a look at Turkey itself, where Erdogan's poll numbers have been falling steadily for a long time and, in view of the elections next year, he has to fear that he may have been president for the longest time. Under enormous pressure, Erdogan leaves little stone unturned to score points with the Turkish population.
He can do that with the attacks on the YPG in northern Syria, because the Turks appreciate military attacks and are now very frustrated by the decades of PKK terror on their territory. In addition, the Turkish leader is trying to present his invasion of northern Syria as the solution to the refugee problem in his country.
The economically stricken Turks urgently want to get rid of their Syrian "guests," as they were initially called. The mood towards refugees is extremely bad. The plan to resettle the refugees in northern Syria after the Kurds have been expelled is doing well. From Cevik's point of view, this is a realistic plan, because the refugees do not want to go there, and forcibly relocating them would be a serious violation of human rights. Erdogan also already controls part of the Syrian border area without refugees having settled there. But even if the plans are impracticable, Erdogan can present himself as a doer in the election campaign.
How high can Erdogan gamble with NATO?
"Erdogan's problem is that the West, especially the US, is looking very closely at its domestic political situation," says expert Cevik. They know very well how to interpret the poor polls and come to the conclusion that the situation of the Turkish president is quite desperate at home, despite his wide-legged appearance on the international stage.
Possibly so desperate that Erdogan needs even the smallest success to convert it into approval in his own country. Such a success could be a simple phone call with US President Joe Biden, or, of course, a face-to-face personal conversation to negotiate the conditions for Ankara's approval of NATO expansion, which would have more media impact. In the past, Erdogan knew how to present himself as an internationally respected player in such settings.
Another currency that the Turkish ruler can use to score points at home is resentment towards the West. The United States, although a NATO ally, has been perceived by the Turkish population for several years as "the greatest threat to the country's security," as political scientist Günter Seufert writes in the Berliner Zeitung. At the beginning of the year, almost 40 percent of Turks voted for cooperation with Moscow and Beijing instead of the USA and Europe.
Negotiate with Joe Biden or annoy Joe Biden - one of the two options should be possible, one would think. But the White House is very focused on not giving Erdogan a stage for his campaign in either way. By simply and effectively ignoring him. "Erdogan is determined to be taken seriously by the United States, but Biden doesn't even mention him in his speeches, he completely ignores him as if he doesn't exist," political expert Cevik describes the US attitude. "With sheer ignorance, Biden drives Erdogan into a frenzy."
A temporary failure of NATO expansion because of Turkey would not only be a difficult result for the alliance, but possibly also for the troublemakers from Ankara. Namely, if it became clear that the West, given Erdogan's weak position in its own country, would simply wait reasonably relaxed in 2022 in order to renegotiate NATO policy with Erdogan's possible successor in the coming year.
